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Abstract— This paper focuses on botnet economics and design 
of defensive strategies. It takes the view that by combining scarce 
information on the attackers’ business models, with rational 
economic analysis of these business processes, one can identify 
design rules for economic defense mechanisms which the target 
can implement, often in a cheap way in addition to technical 
means. A short survey of game theory in the security area, is 
followed by a real case of an Internet casino. This leads to develop 
a model, applicable to this case and others, which is presented 
first qualitatively then quantitatively. This allows carrying out 
different analyses based on different equilibrium or termination 
principles; the ones studied are reward break-even analysis, and 
Max-Min analysis from game theory, for the target and the 
attackers. On that basis, a number of specific economic and 
information led defense strategies are identified which can be 
further studied using the model and specific adaptations to other 
data or cases.
Index Terms— Botnets, Economics, Game theory, Internet 
casinos, Cyber defense
PREAMBLE
Needless to say, this paper does not deal with technical 
measures. It is not claimed either that only the suggested 
approaches will help. It takes a more comprehensive view 
rooted in exploiting some of attacker’s value judgments.
I. INTRODUCTIONANDMOTIVATION
A botnet is a network that consists of compromised 
computers, or bots controlled by botnet masters, infected by 
malicious software which allows cybercriminals to control 
infected machines remotely without the users’ knowledge [1]. 
Botnet owners’ sources of income include DDoS attacks, theft 
of confidential information and application serial numbers, 
spam (SMTP mail relays for spam (Spambot)), IDs,  financial 
information such as credit card numbers and bank accounts, 
phishing, search engine spam, click fraud and distribution of 
malware and adware, etc... New phishing sites are now mass-
produced, with botnets used to protect sites from closure. The 
attackers are generally thought to be mostly motivated by self-
fulfillment, fun, and proof of skills, or by specific orders to 
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damage. However, there is every reason to believe that a 
significant proportion of them are also financially driven by 
gain, and thus develop business models that include building, 
exploiting botnets and trading information on targets and 
penetration mechanisms. A study has shown
how spammers cash in, and are profitable even if they get as 
little as one response for every many spam mails sent out [2-
4]. According to [5], botnet owners make significant amounts 
of money by cheating on online advertising and game 
agencies that use the PPC (Pay-Per-Click) scheme pay; it is 
claimed that about 17% of all advertising link clicks in 2008 
were fake, of which a third was generated by botnets.
In addition to technical approaches, which often tend to be 
costly, this paper takes the view that by combining scarce 
information on the attacker’s business models, with rational 
economic analysis of these business processes, one can 
identify some qualitative guidance on additional economic 
defense mechanisms which the target can implement, often in 
a cheaper way. While this constitutes a challenge it also 
highlights the need sometimes for commercial targets, to 
mitigate their own business models in view of those of 
attackers, in an equally rational way [6].
This notion of trade-off also leads the present paper to 
exploit the potential of game theory, although this has been 
too little researched in the context of botnet economics. Some 
papers have considered using cost-benefit analysis from the 
defender’s viewpoint, but not exploiting the attacker’s 
strategies other than by some statistical properties [7]. 
Common to the many theories in the game field, are the 
existence of several players having different goal functions, 
and of a choice of trade-offs (called equilibria) or of 
termination rules. While some games using quantified models 
for the behaviors and goals have numerical solutions, a large 
class can be analyzed in the presence of even uncertain 
parameters to devise qualitative strategies. The model 
developed in this study can help understanding the interaction
between botnet attackers, target, and also the customers of the 
target.
While acknowledging that insights into attacker’s 
strategies are few, this paper exploits the observation and 
partial information about a case in the Internet game area, 
falling initially under the category of gain from click fraud. 
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The interesting aspect is that this case represents a “real 
honeypot” as opposed to “virtual bots” used sometimes. This 
case also shows that attackers can to some extent organize 
themselves as economic agents with different roles, such as 
botnet masters and attackers who rent bots from the previous. 
The gain-driven botnet masters and attackers make decisions 
on parameters of the efforts and penetrations, such as the 
optimal size of botnets, botnet operating costs, the bot rental 
prices and assumed relative skills between them.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short survey of 
the limited research on the use of game theory in the security 
area (which applied readers may jump over), is presented the 
case of an Internet casino. This illustrative example brings us 
to develop a model, applicable to this case but of much more 
general nature, which is presented first qualitatively then 
quantitatively, with later simplifications. This allows to carry 
out, as explained above, different analyses based on different 
equilibrium or termination principles; the ones studied are 
reward break-even analysis, and Max-Min analysis from 
game theory, for the target and the attackers; additional 
simplifications allow to make more explicit some specific 
results including using data from the case. Before proceeding 
with summarizing suggested defense mechanisms, criticism 
of the model is made on the basis of day-to-day observations. 
A number of specific economic defense strategies are 
identified which can be further studied using the model and 
specific adaptations to other data or cases. 
II. OVERVIEWOFSECURITYGAMES
A game is a contest wherein several players choose, 
according to a specified set of rules from among a number of 
permitted alternative actions, in an effort to win certain 
rewards. In the security area, the players each have assets to 
protect, and rewards to win amongst themselves and others. 
Such games are usually non-cooperative, and furthermore 
dynamic, and sometimes involve the formation of coalitions; 
there are very many theories and variants, and the reader is 
referred to [8,9] for comprehensive relevant exposs. Players 
make their decisions independently and each one seeks 
unilaterally the maximum possible gain, of course by also 
taking into account the possible rational choices of the other 
players. A special case, called Max-Min (or Min-Max) in 
gametheory, is when each player maximizes unilaterally his 
gain when the other players minimize simultaneously their 
losses (or maximize their own specific gains). Another 
equilibrium type is Nash, where no player unilaterally can 
win by moving away from the equilibrium if it exists.
In [10], it is assumed that attacks are on one target at the 
time; a certain amount of effort is put progressively, with 
increasing and convex costs, but attacker only achieves a 
probability of success in yielding a reward. The attacker will 
seek to maximize the actual reward, but has to decide as a 
strategy on an optimal stopping rule by computing the 
expected gain of carrying on with the attack and carrying the 
costs. The model of Section 4 is a variant but takes the 
pragmatic view that the probability of success is only skills 
and time based, and not cost related. Reference [10] gives 
some results assuming an explicit form (1-exp(-t/α)) for the 
probability of success with time t, and an explicit linearly 
increasing cost with time. It also considers the case of 
switching costs in changing target, if the expected benefit of 
going on with the current target gets below the expected 
benefit from the new target. Assuming the attacker realizes 
the target’s security level after switching to it, he will both 
pay the switching cost and higher penetration cost; this 
implies that a target should apply in cycles increasing security 
levels to deter attackers. The target may also claim to be 
highly secure, and thus the attacker does not know whether 
the target has a high or low security level; the attacker is then 
forced to apply Bayesian inference, and it is shown that low 
security targets are better off hiding the fact that they are low-
security, and high security targets should advertise that they 
are highly secure.
In [11] was studied a non-detection “cat-and-mouse” case 
as a Nash equilibrium “game,  with  malicious packets hiding 
within a normal flow, sent by an attacker trying not to be 
detected, while the defender is active. The attacker must 
select a path, such as a highly loaded link; to send his 
malicious packet so as to minimize the detection probability 
.The defender must select the links to scan to maximize the 
detection. In [12] the reverse is studied in a similar way, in 
that the defender wants to send some flow through a network 
with vulnerable links subject to attacks.
III. CASE: ATTACKSONAN INTERNETCASINO
A. Context
The observations below are from a specific context, and 
obviously cannot be generalized. The target is interesting and 
viable for attackers. But it also represents a site needing 
monitoring and control by public authorities under evolving 
legislation for Internet casinos. The host country for the 
Internet casino was one of the first in Europe to allow on 
commercial and regulated terms such games for real money. 
Furthermore, because of the permeability between players in 
real casinos and those trying out Internet casinos, as driven by
expertise in the specific games offered, some information 
could be collected about the comparative expected  rewards, 
and thus on the  reward levels expected by attackers. Finally, 
traffic monitoring could be effected with the assistance of the 
ISP meeting the conditions of the evolving legislation and 
procedures applicable to Internet casinos.  
B. SIP vulnerability
A problem with single sign-on with SIP opens up for 
malware, and allows for botnet attacks at the SIP signaling
level. This despite IETF protocols for intrusion detection 
(IDXP, IDMEF; RFC 4765-4767) which can stop botnets 
close to the root. It allows botnet control traffic to be tunneled 
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inside legitimate SIP clients, and thus for attackers to carry 
out learning on a target.
C. Exploitation by attackers and observed data
Viewing botnets as a “service” exploited as indicated 
above, attackers rent the access to the SIP network among 
themselves on a time basis, in view of carrying out the 
learning and the attacks represented by a botnet “success”. 
Such a “success” is defined as taking over the target’s 
application, here the casino, with low observability , and 
minimal command-and-control traffic, while collecting 
revenue from renting the botnet for spamming and/or or 
intrusion, until detected. In other words, the attackers want to 
take over and use the casino in a stealthy way. The revenue 
from the intrusion depends on the attacker’s ability, while in 
control, to siphon off assets under control of the target. 
Normally, the Internet casino receives the bets from its 
customers via a third party deposit bank, which is out of reach
from attacks. However, the Internet casino itself decides on 
payouts to winning customers. Assets over which control may 
happen are the orders to execute payment of game wins to 
winning customers, and possibly to declare as winners all 
players on a given game at the time of the intrusion , with 
payments to be effected via payment orders to the bank.
The typical rent until “success” was reported to be in the 
50 000 USD range for maximum 24 hours, after which the 
party renting out access to the site in the way described would 
terminate the sign-on problem, and thus deny the tenant 
attacker  to continue in the quality of botnet master. Due to 
constraints on game session durations and max wins per 
game, the absolute ceiling for cumulated rewards to an 
attacker from intrusion over 24 h has been estimated by the 
casino company to be about C= 2800 USD.
This leads to the conjecture that attackers sometimes earn 
income from each other, supplementing opportunistic rewards 
from successful attacks on the targets. They may use a kind of 
arbitrage. It has not been investigated how attackers 
communicate with each other; nor is it known if the rental 
market is organized or not, besides bilateral deals which the 
model below is assuming.
A technical research issue is to build testbeds to analyze 
botnets,  open stack real-time  network emulators such as 
CORE [13], to determine what is the lowest bound on 
command-and-control traffic needed to maintain a botnet 
running, and thus use this information to deny botnet attacks 
for given threat models.
IV. MODEL
A. General case
The situation depicted in the case, as well as many others, 
can be formalized as a game between (N+1) players, where 
player i=0 is the target, and players i=1,…,N are the 
attackers. The reward structure for each player “Reward (i)” 
is a money flow, meaning the total cumulated income (or 
cost) over a time period T.
The Reward (0) to the target (0) is:
-gaming income: proportional to the product of total 
number of third-party paying customers (∫n (t) dt, t: 0 to T), 
by the fee per game session “usagefee”;
-instantaneous cost of winning customers: proportional to 
the average winning probability pwin to the instantaneous 
number of customers n (t), by the ceiling “C” on rewards to 
the winning customers per game session.
-intrusion cost: the cost of successful intrusions to the 
target (0), as specified below; the attackers are supposed not 
also to be legitimate customers.
The probability of a reward to an attacker (i) by a 
successful intrusion of the target (0) is a time-dependent 
probability function “p (i,t(i))” corresponding to the learning 
process involved in possibly achieving a reward after a lapse 
t(i). The reward “Reward(i)” to one attacker (i) is the sum of 
the income:
-from rentals from other one’s (j) is a deterministic 
function of time “rent (i,j,t(j))” and the sum of these rental 
incomes from all other attackers j; 
-from intrusions: assuming the attacker (i) to take control 
of the target (0) after a lapse t(i) after he has become a tenant, 
and thus to syphon off all maximum rewards otherwise due to 
customers, his revenue will, in the best case for him, be the 
ceiling on rewards “C” multiplied by the number of customers
n (ti+t (i)) at that point in time.
As to legitimate game customers, the net revenue to a given
paying customer Reward (customer) at time t, is his winning 
reward (pwin*C) minus his “usagefee” per session. 
At any time , due to the nature of the vulnerability 
described in Section 3, only one botnet attack can take place, 
once a player (i) has granted a different player(j),  the access 
against the payment of rent(i,j,t(j)). Thus, in a general case, a 
Markov model is needed to represent all the transitions 
between attackers i=1,…,N , each operating for a lapse t(i), 
apart from lapses with no on-going attacks.
B. Simplification with equal attack durations
A simplification , sufficient for the subsequent  design of 
strategies, is to assume that  all attackers carry out multiple
simultaneous attacks for the same lapse t(i)=Δt, and that there 
are no  idle periods;  the number of attacks shall then  be 
A=N(N-1) and the average duration average(Δt)=T/(N*(N-
1)). The time ti at which attacker(i) starts his attack then 
becomes a specific multiple of Δt, dependent on the order of 
the attackers. We then get over time period T:
Reward (customer) = pwin * C – usagefee (1)
Reward(0)= (usagefee-pwin)* [ ∫ n(t)dt, t=0, T] –C* [∑n 
(k*Δt), k=1, A]                                      (2)
Reward(i)= ∑ ([rent (i, j, Δt)-rent (j, i, Δt)], j=1,..N) + p (i, 
Δt) * C*n (ti+ Δt)                       (3)
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A= N*(N-1)                                                           (4)
Δt =t(i) =t(j) = Average (t (i)) = T/ [N*(N-1)] (5)
The best intrusion reward assumption to an attacker can be 
changed by modifying the ceiling C. 
C. Generalizations
-The model above is quite adequate to describe a wider 
class of botnet economics where the Internet casino case is 
replaced by a broader class of services to customers from 
which the defender collects revenue, part of which may be 
exposed to attackers. What would change is the “Reward 
(customer)” part possibly even disappearing to be replaced by 
quality of service satisfaction goals; the income and cost 
parameter parts of Reward (0) would also have to be adapted.
-The model already incorporates the case where the attacks 
of some of “i” are for pay, in that “rent(i,j,t(j))” can be 
extended to the case where rent(i,i,t(i))≠ 0 representing the 
payment to “i “ received by a paymaster. Likewise, it is easy 
to give special characteristics to the business parameters of a 
botnet master compared to other attackers.
-Also, it is easy to incorporate in Reward(i) an additional 
term representing attack costs to attacker “i”; they have in 
this paper been neglected as no data where known in the case 
depicted on the cost structure of the attackers.
-Finally, under suitable distribution assumptions, 
likelihoods of rewards and savings can be estimated.
V. ANALYSIS
The model and data of Sections 3 and 4 allow studying 
behaviors under different types of assumptions and concepts.
A. Break-even analysis
This corresponds to the behavior of the players when they 
just break even over a time period T, that is their rewards are 
0, as their income is outweighed by costs.
-a1. for attacker “i “:
p(i,Δt) = (∑([rent(j,i ,Δt)-rent(i,j,Δt)],j=1,..N))/(C*n(ti+ Δt))         
(6)
which tells that the attacker must, to achieve breakeven,
maximize his probability of success from  learning,  by 
negotiating   as asymmetric rents as possible with other 
attackers, and hope for  the target to have as few customers as 
possible at the time of his attack. This means that in-fighting
/ competition between attackers is for them a necessary 
condition for break-even .It also confirms from the condition 
p (i,t) ≤1 that: 
∑([rent(j, i, Δt)-rent(i ,j,Δt)],j=1,..,N) ≤ (C*n(ti+Δt)) (7)
i.e. that the rent differences are bounded by a function 
proportional to the maximum reward and to the number of 
customers.
Assuming the rents rent(i,j,t(j)) to be proportional to their 
duration so that rent(i,j,Δt)=rent(i,j)*Δt , the same inequality, 
when data from Section 3 are entered for “rent” and “C= 
2800”, and “Δt” is replaced by its value, shows that there is a 
lower bound on the number of attackers N which increases 
roughly proportional to the duration T, and decreases when 
the number of instantaneous customers grow; this is a 
normal consequence of the learning process:
N(N-1) ≥ 17* (T/n(ti+ Δt)) (8)
In all cases, there is an intrinsic contradiction in benefits to 
the attacker aiming for breakeven, between a target with few 
and many customers.
-a.2: for the target i=0: Rewards(0) are:
(usagefee-pwin)* [ ∫ n(t)dt, t=0, T=C*[∑n(k*Δt), k=1,A] (9)
which means that that the target must for breakeven 
increase the “usagefee” charged to customers with the 
expected number of attackers/attacks, and obviously with the 
maximum reward to customers. In the special case where the 
instantaneous number of customers is constant n(t)=n, the 
corresponding simplified breakeven condition shows a 
quadratic dependency on the number of attacks:
usagefee= pwin+C*N*(N-1)/T (10)
B. Max-Min analysis
The well-known Max-Min equilibrium, or saddle point, in 
games with one defender and many attackers, aims at 
determining the probability distributions of the decision 
variables of the defender and attackers, so that, 
simultaneously, the defender minimizes his average loss and 
the attackers maximize their average gain.
In the case of the attackers, the key decision variable is the 
duration of each attacker’s rent and learning period “t(i)”. In 
the case of the target, the key decision variables in the 
presence of unknown number of attackers and unknown 
number of customers, is how to set the “usagefee” and the 
maximum payout “C”.
This game is fundamentally not a zero sum game, term 
used to depict the circumstances where the loss to the target, 
is balanced off by an equal gain of the attackers, and vice-
versa. Thus one must separate out the game strategies driven 
by either the target‘s concerns or the attacker’s concerns.
As this paper deals with the attackers, in view of devising 
weaknesses in their strategies, the Max-Min strategy of an 
attacker i=1,..,N will be such that it satisfies:
Max[Reward (i)│t(i)] (Min[Reward (0) │(usagefee, C)] (11)
where │stands for a condition on subsequent argument 
being given. As the inner-loop maximum can be shown to be 
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linear with a positive coefficient  w.r.t. “usagefee” and 
negative w.r.t. “C”, we must assume a maximum value called 
“usagefeeMax” and a minimum value for “C” called “CMin”, 
so that the Max-Min strategy of the attacker i satisfies:
Max [∑([rent(i,j,Δt)-rent(j,i,Δt)],j=1,..N) + p (i, Δt) * 
CMin*n(ti Δt) │t (i)] (12)
CMin ≥ usagefeeMax ≥ 0 (13)
which shows that, such a strategy is satisfied when the 
attack duration t(i) maximizes the probability of a reward, 
meaning when the efficiency of the attack is maximum; this 
is an obvious result. If that Max-Min result does not achieve 
the break-even condition of Section 5.a1 for C=CMin we are 
back to that case.
The Min-Max strategy of the attacker would correspond to 
the guaranteed minimum reward to attacker (i) when the 
target maximizes his reward, that is:
Min [∑([rent(i,j,Δt)-rent(j,i,Δt)],j=1,..N) + p (i,Δt) * 
CMin*n(ti+Δt) │t (i)] (14)
which corresponds to the case where the probability of an 
intrusion reward is minimum, including zero. It can be seen 
that even in that case, the attacker (i) may still achieve a 
positive minimum reward, either because the rent structure 
between attackers is skewed in his favour, or because the 
attack learning efficiency is still non-zero positive and the 
minimum reward CMin is high. 
In the special case where the instantaneous number of 
customers is constant n(t)=n, the corresponding simplified 
Max-Min and Min-Max conditions relate to the optima over 
t(i) of the expression :
[∑([rent(i,j)-rent(j,i)],j=1,..N) + p(i,Δt) * CMin*n*N*(N-1)/T 
(15)
which shows a very complex and interesting interdepend-
dency. Even with certainty on success, the attacker “i” can 
still achieve a negative Max-Min reward if the rent structure 
between attackers, their number, the number of customers and
the minimum reward satisfy jointly a negative value for the 
expression (15).
VI. STARTINGFROMPRACTICE
It can easily be claimed that the analysis made in the 
preceding Sections is theoretical and remote from some day-
to-day operational observations which are summarized below, 
but these observations in turn give no clue as to systematic 
strategies as suggested in this paper in Section 7.
Some assumptions are made about a general attacker's (i.e. 
bot herder's) course of action and that maximizing an 
immediate financial reward is their ultimate goal. Observing 
general botnet attack cases, one may conclude that attackers 
do not organize their resources with regards to professional 
economic strategies. Providing a setup of virtual bots to 
introduce uncertainty and added costs for the botmaster 
implies effort on the defenders' side too. Additionally, it is 
arguable if attackers would even care or just go on with some 
virtual bots that cannot be used for attacks.
It is suggested to introduce a virtual attacker that exploits 
the cooperative structure of the attackers renting services 
from each other, by influencing the pricing standards, thus 
influencing the market in a way that some services are simply 
not profitable anymore. This means that an open market is 
assumed as random people are allowed to join, which may not 
always be true. On the other hand, the attackers do not want a  
closed market, as then it would be easier to infiltrate the 
attackers' communication channel to track them down and 
prosecute them.
The model assumes that the victim of an attack has some 
degree of freedom for controlling the availability of his 
service. In the case presented, the online casino would buffer 
user communication and process the queue in bursts. By 
varying the input processing strategy, an attacker's reward 
strategy shall be influenced in a way that maximization is 
more difficult. This paper cannot provide evidence that 
attackers act on such a formal level. At the same time, the 
assumed flexibility is not given in many cases, but can be 
engineered with clear advantages.
VII. ECONOMICDEFENSESTRATEGIES
Existing technical approaches aim, either at to preventing 
infected machines from reaching the target, or to redirect the 
visit of infected computers to a different site. Such defenses 
tend to be passive, costly and sometimes inefficient mainly 
because current Internet architecture makes it extremely 
difficult to differentiate a “pretend-to-be-legitimate” request 
from a “true legitimate” visit.
That is why this paper proposes to identify some additional 
economic and information based defense mechanisms , by 
combining scarce information on the attackers’ business 
models, with rational economic analysis of these business 
models, which the target can implement, often in a cheaper 
way. Most of these mechanisms aim at creating economic dis-
incentives to the attackers. We list below those identified in 
this paper, mostly from the analysis in Section 5:
A. Virtual bots
The idea of using virtual bots (honeypots running on 
virtual machines that can be compromised by the botnet 
masters) to create uncertainty and added costs in the level of 
botnet attacks is known [7, 10]. The uncertainty introduced by
virtual bots has a significant impact on the profits gains from 
botnet attacks; it generates decreasing profitability, mostly by 
increasing real or estimated costs, and reduces the botnet 
related activities by economic dis-incentives. At any point in 
time, the capacity of the server limits the number of supported 
compromised machines, further limiting the number of bots 
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rents used to attack the target.
B. Maximizing the asymmetric nature of botnet rents
We have shown above that the differential term 
[∑([rent(i,j, Δt)-rent(j,i,Δt)],j=1,..N)], representing the rental 
income to attacker “i” from all other attackers, plays a major 
role in break-even as well as Max-Min equilibrium analysis. 
This means that a virtual attacker controlled by the target, 
can drive down the rewards to the attackers, even in case of 
successful penetrations, just by choosing a suitable rent 
structure amongst the attackers, which this virtual attacker 
can advertise on suitable channels.
C. Using customer traffic variability
We have shown above that the success probability from 
learning “p(i,Δt)“ is severely affected in the break-even and 
equilibrium conditions, by the instantaneous customer traffic 
density n(t) in relation to the total customer volume over the 
time period T. For services which are not too time sensitive, 
such as those from the casino case (and many others), it pays 
off to periodically buffer customer traffic to create, via 
fluctuations in how n(t) affects the rewards, such fluctuations 
in the learning periods t(i), so that attackers “i“ will consider 
the learning to be ineffective.    
D. Customer traffic fluctuations affecting dynamically 
possible botnet rents
We have shown above that the rents are bound by an upper 
bound proportional to the customer traffic density. If that
bound is operative, as it is likely to be as attackers will all 
each try to maximize their statically defined rental incomes, 
just having to renegotiate rents dynamically creates such an 
overhead to the attackers that they will skip them.
E. Determining carefully the minimum reward and 
payment time
We have shown above that in the Min-Max equilibrium 
case, the guaranteed reward to an attacker may be low, if not 
even negative, if the product [CMin*n*N*(N-1)] is low. The 
number of attacks shall be kept low by technical means, but 
the disincentive created by minimizing the on-line real-time 
rewards is likely to be syphoned off by a penetration. While 
respecting applicable regulations, in this case to casino 
rewards, the defender can in his on-line systems run a very 
low real-time reward CMin, while instructing the bank to 
apply C to time-shifted payments to legitimate winning 
customers.
F. Adaptive economic defense strategy
We have shown that, under simplifying assumptions, the 
Max-Min and Min-Max rewards to an attacker (i) depend on 
the top or floor values of the expression in Eq (15). In the 
case where the defender may have an estimate of the attack 
density from detection probes, he can adaptively modulate n 
and CMin to confuse the attacker’s perception of his success 
probability and reward level.
G. Claiming high security protection
Reference [10] suggests that, under some theoretical 
assumptions, a target is better off hiding the fact that it is 
low-security, and a high security target should advertise that 
it is highly secure. This paper does not claim that this 
approach will work, but only that it has been suggested and 
tested.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Economic defense strategies derived from data, models and 
analysis about botnet attacker’s economic behaviors, while 
respecting the target’s own goals, represent a valuable 
addition to technical security measures. The use of game 
theory has the advantage of making explicit the trade-offs the 
target must make in its normal business models to 
accommodate and limit the effects of attacker’s own business 
models. This extends statistical techniques [14] by further 
more allowing to design statistical strategies in a game 
theoretical framework. While this paper is inspired by a 
concrete case, the model can be extended to other types of 
service businesses, and shows explicitly how dynamics in the 
user-led demand can help the target. 
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